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Note to the reader: 
As often happens, this paper has not had the amount of time, attention and effort put into it, as it would have deserved. However, I hope that the structure of the argument will be visible for the reader and that it will inspire to further comments and discussions. Needless to say that comments of any sort are more than welcome.

Abstract: 
Analysing contemporary welfare state change and –reforms, one important aspect is the individualisation and de-standardisation of social risks and citizens’ needs. Broad societal changes such as changes in the social structure and individualization have great impact on welfare policies as well as on definitions of citizenship and the possible empowerment of citizens. 
From a sociological perspective this paper intends to discuss the concepts of individualization and new social risks, aiming at some analytical clarification regarding the content of these concepts and the possible impact on welfare states. As an example of individualization and the handling of individualization, the paper briefly discusses the introduction in Denmark of “contract-management” and the individual action plan. 
Introduction: Welfare states and ‘late modernity’
When analysing changes in the welfare state(s), references are sometimes made to the encompassing changes of societies: the rise of complexity, the end of class, de-standardization of life-courses, new types of social problems, globalisation, immigration etc. However, this paper argues, that the comprehensive understanding of these changes within welfare state research should be improved, and for this purpose insight from general sociology could be useful. Hence, the paper focuses on the “consequences of late modernity” – so to speak – for the changes in welfare states.
	The paper begins by presenting a recent discussion of the connection between social changes and welfare state change, namely Esping-Andersen’s discussion of the challenge of new social risks (Esping-Andersen, 1999). Along with the presentation of his basic argument, I claim that his conceptualisation of new social risks centres too much on the understanding of political economy, and thus tends to overlook some of the social changes that –from a sociological viewpoint – seem to be the most significant.
	Following this initial claim, I propose the fruitfulness of the insights from three of the major sociological figures in the 20th century: Anthony Giddens, Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu. In an admittedly very brief and summary theoretical discussion, I demonstrate how – theoretical differences aside –these sociologists all highlight some of the same basic traits of late modernity, namely the rising importance of knowledge and the changing relationship between the individual and society (as well the state). Underlining the argument, the paper will close with an empirical example of how one might detect some of these social changes as concrete changes in welfare state policy. Using this example (of the individual action plan in a Danish context), some consequences for the dynamics of welfare state change as well as further research questions will be suggested.

New – and old – social risks
In his recent discussion of the new challenges facing contemporary welfare states and regimes, Esping-Andersen proposes to look at the formation as well as the changes of welfare regimes through the concept of social risks. In this light, the basic objective of all welfare states has been to “insure the population against social risks” (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 32). The concept of social risks is not defined as such, but it refers to the misfortunes (poverty, illness, sudden death etc.) that can happen to an individual or a family.​[1]​ Hence, risks are something faced by people throughout history, and as such it is not a new phenomenon, even though the degree to which risks are considered social could be new.
	Further, Esping-Andersen discusses three main axes, along which risks traditionally can be classified, and thereby he outlines the “old” conception of social risks addressed by the welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 40-43). These axes are i) class risks, i.e. the degree to which social risks are unevenly distributed between classes, ii) life-course risks, i.e. the degree to which social risks tend to be concentrated in the beginning and the end of a persons life, and iii) intergenerational risks, i.e. the tendency of risks being systematically transferred from one generation to the next (within the family), thus reproducing ascriptive mechanisms in a modern society otherwise promising meritocracy.
	These social risks and their tendency to be unevenly distributed is, then, seen as the basic cornerstone of the welfare states, and the differences between the three welfare regimes can be summarised with reference to the differences in handling social risks. Thus, the residual model “adheres to a narrow conception of what risks should be considered social” (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 75), and the market becomes the key institution in handling social risks and providing welfare. Here, the state-provided welfare only addresses “bad risks” (ibid) in targeted programmes. The universal or social democratic model “is particularly committed to comprehensive risks coverage”, and the socialization of risks is evident, along with the attachment of rights to citizenship (individuals) and the provision of welfare primarily by the state. Finally, the conservative or familial model “is most evident with regard to risk pooling (solidarity) and familialism” (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 82), meaning that the family is the key institution in handling risk-pooling, sometimes in combination with state measures upholding the differences of status (class) and gender as well as the family as an institution.
	As can be seen from this short presentation, the introduction of the concept of social risks fits well into the understanding of the welfare regimes. The point is, then, that social risks is not only important in the construction of these differences, but also – and perhaps even more so – in the continuing reproduction of the welfare institutions. Further, these institutional and regime differences matter for the absorption and pooling of risks, for the construction of solidarity and for the stratification of society (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 86).
	Thus, Esping-Andersen suggests that the new challenges facing the postindustrial welfare states also must be understood and analysed in terms of the concept of social risks. The point seems to be that the new challenges centres around economic globalisation and changing labour markets, demanding flexibility and high skilled-workers. This results in the creation of job-insecurity, and the exclusion of workers with low skills, especially older (male) workers with outdated forms of experience, and young workers being unable to enter the labour markets (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 99-142, 146). Along with these economic changes Esping-Andersen also suggest the importance of changing family relationships, with divorce-rates rising and attempts to combine careers and children, creating new forms of risks, especially for women. 
	In other words, the new social risks are not so much ‘new’ in substance. It is still a matter of the distribution of misfortunes: poverty, illness etc. What is new is the distribution of these risks. The primary axes of the distribution of social risks are – according to Esping-Andersen – no longer class, nor intergenerational reproduction, and the standardized life course presumed by the risks pooling mechanisms of the welfare states have become de-standardized, disrupting the financial equilibrium of the welfare states. What we face now, then, is the danger of creating a new “class of losers” (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 149), with the concentration of poverty among young households and single mothers. 
	Esping-Andersen concludes his discussion with the argument that these new challenges are met by institutions created in an era dominated by “old social risks”. Consequently, this institutional setting is unfit to handle the new challenges, and it may even be so that the political dynamics will inhibit the needed changes (e.g. the meeting of social risks by welfare services), since the political alliance upholding the welfare state are made up by people “representing the traditional rather than the emerging risk structure” (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 148).
	I will, however, leave the discussion of the political dynamics aside, and in stead concentrate on the identification of the new social risks. As mentioned, these are not so much new in substance as they are distributed in a new way. However, I claim that this definition does not go far enough in understanding the challenges of late modernity faced by the welfare states. This has several reasons, one of which Esping-Andersen himself mentions in the beginning of Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies (1999), when commenting on the criticisms made to him by feminism. Here he suggests that the welfare regime typology has been grounded upon an understanding of political economy and hence has tended to neglect the family as an institution (Esping-Andersen, 1999: 11). My first point would be, that the same argument goes for understanding individualization and what Schmidt (1999) has called “personhood” (personskabet / personalitet), i.e. the discursive and structural formations surrounding the modern individual. 
	This point can be illustrated by the analytical framework presented by Schmidt (“the social-analytical cross”), in his effort to pinpoint the main dimensions in modern society as well as its historical roots. The cross is explicitly analytical, i.e. an epistemological and heuristic tool that can guide comparisons and the identification of homologies. Hence, the advantages of the cross (or map), are the two main dimensions suggested to structure any sociological investigation, namely i) individuality vs. collectivity and ii) the global/universal vs. the local/particular. These two dimensions “carve out” four main areas, and applied to the basic institutions of society it looks like this (Schmidt, 1999: 248; Hermann, 2003: 57ff):













Figure 1: The socio-analytical cross

I shall not go further into the potential uses of the analytical framework (see e.g. Hermann 2003 for a discussion of the development of the concept of ‘competence’). The point is merely to illustrate, that the triad of institutions discussed by Esping-Andersen (market-state-family) tends to overlook exactly the area, in which the sociological discussion of late modernity seem to centre, namely the formation of the self, individualization and the consequences hereof for the relationship between the individual and society (i.e. civil society, state and market). Thus, Esping-Andersen misses the potential changes in substance of the new social risks created by late modernity.
	My second point towards the identification of new social risks concerns the discussion of its distribution. Here, it seems as if Esping-Andersen confuses the stratificational effects of the welfare state with stratification per se. Consequently, he fails to appreciate the potential new structures of stratification involved in the growing importance of knowledge, tendencies that are not necessarily related to the institutional set up of the welfare states. The point is, then, that the groups in danger of being excluded cannot be described just as being young or single mothers. Instead we must consider a transformation of the structural foundation of inequality (or class) involved in the changes of late modernity:
It is evident from the results from the research on social heritage that social inequality has changed. One should not underestimate the importance of bad economy, bad housing and material need, but the research shows a pretty clear picture of a new aspect of social inequality.
	It is not so much material as cultural inequality that is in focus, when the inequalities of today are being described.
	A picture is forming of a new kind of social inequality. What is important is the feeling of being excluded in a society that poses increasingly hard demands towards the abilities of people in terms of mobilising personal competences and making personal decisions [...] (Ploug, 2005: 16, my translation, GSH, See also Undervisningsministeriet, 2005)
In the remaining parts of this paper, I will show how the sociological insights from Giddens, Foucault and Bourdieu can deepen our understanding of the new forms of social risks presented by late modernity, and the way in which these new social risks seem to be distributed. 

Insights from sociology
The sociological discussions of late modernity (post-modernity, hyper-modernity etc. etc.) are many, and the task of demonstrating how welfare state research can benefit from sociology seems at first hand to run the risk of making crude generalizations and reductions. What I suggest in the following, then, is not a comprehensive theoretical or empirical discussion of the sociological legacy for welfare state research. Rather, it should be seen as suggestions of areas for further theoretical development and empirical investigation.​[2]​ Consequently, the discussion here focuses primarily on (aspects of) the diagnostic content of the works of Giddens, Foucault and Bourdieu, and not on their theoretical differences or the differences in epistemology and analytical strategies. 
	What is of interest is Giddens’ discussion of modern reflexivity and the formation of the self, Foucault’s discussion of the intersection of knowledge and power, state and the self, and Bourdieu’s demonstration of how knowledge and cultural capital produces a new stratificational order.

Reflexive modernization
Anthony Giddens is famous for his sweeping diagnosis of late modern society (e.g. Giddens, 19XX, 1991), and the “common sense sociological understanding” of what late modernity (or high modernity, as Giddens often calls is) is about is more or less indebted to Giddens’ conceptualisations. 
	Very briefly, one can say that Giddens draw attention to high modernity (continuing, not breaking with, the processes of modernization) as involving on the one hand the creation of abstract mechanisms that facilitate social integration not founded upon face-to-face interaction. This is what Giddens calls the separation of time and space and the workings of disembedding mechanisms, and what is sometimes by other theorist (e.g. Habermas, Luhmann and Bourdieu) considered under the heading of ‘functional differentiation’. 
	On the other hand, high modernity features the growing importance of reflexivity:
Modernity’s reflexivity refers to the susceptibility of most aspects of social activity, and material relations with nature, to chronic revisions in the light of new information or knowledge. Such information or knowledge is not incidental to modern institutions, but constitutive of them [...] (Giddens, 1991: 20)
In other words, what is characteristic of high modernity is the tendency of all human activities becoming founded upon knowledge produced by social institutions and mediated by abstract mechanisms such as the market or different expert systems (e.g. the health system, the system of care, or the system of pedagogical understanding of children’s development). 
	This has vital consequences for the individual, both for the “construction” of the individual, for the relationship of the self to itself and for the relationships to other people or the state. As Giddens states:
The reflexivity of modernity extends into the core of the self. Put in another way, in the context of a post-traditional order, the self becomes a reflexive project. [...] In the settings of modernity, by contrast, the altered self has to be explored and constructed as part of a reflexive process of connecting personal and social change. (Giddens, 1991: 32-33).
Thus, Giddens suggests that the individual in high modernity becomes involved in the construction of her own identity, something that was previously founded in the local and concrete social surroundings of everyday life. This is of course a process extending back from the establishment of modern society itself, where the fate and lifestyles of individuals was lifted out of norm-regulated structures. 
	However, the reflexive modernization of late or high modernity adds to the process of individualization the extended use of knowledge, the reliance upon expert systems and the (conscious or practical) deliberative monitoring and construction of ones own identity. The consequences of this intensification of individualization are first, the accelerating de-standardization of individual’s life-courses and life-styles as well as the “final break” with the stratificational order of traditional class society. However, the question is whether or not we are witnessing the introduction of new forms of integration, standardizations of life-styles and a different order of stratification rather than the abolishment of stratification altogether. I will return to this point later.
	The second consequence is existential. In an ongoing reflexive process of self-construction, the self is in permanent danger of dismantling what Giddens calls its ontological security, i.e. its basic trust in the (physical and social) world. However, high modernity also involves the possibility of reskilling and empowerment in the sense that the individual has the opportunity of re-creating her ontological security and sense of herself using the knowledge available to her. The process of empowerment is by no means certain, though, and high modernity also contains the potential for fatalism and the submission of people to new forms of authority (e.g. religious or commercial) (Giddens, 1991: 139-143).
	Third, there are political consequences of high modernity. Thus, Giddens proposes the concept of life-politics to capture the growing significance of new areas of politics related to the everyday life of citizens (e.g. equality between sexes, environmental protection). Also, he suggests that the welfare state should move towards the provision of positive welfare instead of “precautionary aftercare”. Although it seems to be more focused on the argument of this paper, I will not go further into Giddens’ discussions of the welfare state. Rather, I claim that the interesting point is not so much Giddens’ analysis of the welfare state but his basic conceptualisation of reflexive modernization and individualization.
	To sum up, then, what confronts the welfare states in late or high modernity are the intensification and spreading of the production and use of knowledge in all aspects of social life, as well as the formation of individuals continuingly handling this knowledge and constructing themselves as selves, i.e. as reflexive projects. But the implications of this modern condition should not be understood in the way suggested by Giddens. In stead, we now turn to Michel Foucault to understand the relationship of these reflexive selves and the state.

The power of self-technologies
To put it crudely, the focus of Foucault’s writings has been on the intersection of power, knowledge and subjectivity (Herman, 1999: 13). Hence, Foucault also subscribes to “story” of the transformations of identity from something given to something actively constructed or chosen by individuals navigating in landscapes of discursive identities produced by different institutions (Andersen & Born, 2005; Foucault, 1988). In his later works, Foucault’s attentions thus centres on the emergence of self-technologies, i.e. forms of handling the construction of identity and the relationship towards one’s self.
	However, the important point (for now) is not so much the emergence of these technologies of the self, but the transformation and adaption of the state. Under the heading of ‘governmentality’ Foucault points to the transformation of the strategies state power (as well as the knowledge and discursive observations of these strategies), involving the immanent control of the excesses of power itself. Hence, the relationship between individuals and the state is no longer solely a biopolitical relationship, with the state producing knowledge of populations in order to control them. Rather, the state abstains from the execution of power and control and in stead governs through the governance of the relationship of individuals to themselves, i.e. through the technologies of the self. 
	This relationship between state and individuals (or the self-relationship of individuals) amounts to an abstraction or “emptying” of policies, where the inability to collect and handle the amount of knowledge necessary to control the details of individuals lives, as well as the ineffectiveness of available steering mechanisms, results in the creation (or emergence) of technologies of the self suited to produce exactly the necessary control. Thus, the individual is made responsible for handling her own freedom, autonomy and empowerment, and, consequently, the goals of society becomes (ethical) goals of the responsible, self-actualising individual: she should educate herself, be productive, be healthy etc. etc. (See e.g. Rose, 1999). Relying on this rational and responsible individual, then, makes possible the creation of state policies aiming at the manipulation of the relationship of the individual to herself. 
	As we shall see below, this is exactly the content of the steering by contract and individual action plans introduced for example in Denmark. As such this points to the introduction of a new way of handling individualisation and de-standardisation of life-courses, as well as the potential introduction of a substantial new kind of risks, i.e. the risk of not being able to handle the relationship to one-self in the expected (rational, responsible, normal) way. In passing, it should also be noted, that the emergence of self-technologies does not only concern the relationship between individuals and state, but also the relationship on the market, especially the labour market and the demand for flexible labour. Here, the introduction of new forms of management draws on precisely the same kind of abstraction in the execution of power, and it therefore relates to the forms of new social risks suggested by Esping-Andersen, i.e. the exclusion of deskilled labour. Although, seen in this light, the point is not so much the amount of education or skills but the ability of the self to relate to herself in the expected way.
	To sum up, the introduction of self-technologies introduces a qualitatively new relationship between individuals and society (state, market) presenting an abstraction in the strategies of power. As for the different policies suited to the manipulation or facilitation of these self-technologies, they present both a new way of handling individualisation and a potential for substantially new social risks. As was argued above, these kinds of risks, i.e. the exclusion of people not rationally handling their self-relationship (autonomy, empowerment), are not in focus in the traditional discussions of welfare state research. Here focus is more on de-standardisation as such (e.g. Guillemard, 2005) and on the new distribution of traditional forms of risks (Esping-Andersen, 1999).
	However, one should be careful not to overestimate the effects of differentiation, de-standardisation as well as individualisation in the context of late or high modernity. Although the process of differentiation and individualisation stands at the centre of many sociologist’s attention (Giddens, Luhmann, Baumann, Beck, Foucault), it is important to realize that the process of social integration does not vanish. As was the case for the upcoming of modern society and the traditional sociological studies by Marx, Weber and Durkheim, what might at first hand look as a process of dissolution, is at closer look also the process of new forms of homogenization and integration (Larsen, 2005). Admittedly, these new forms of reintegration are also studied by sociologist, in the form of rationalities and discourses (Foucault), life-styles (Giddens) and mechanisms of couplings (Luhmann, see e.g. Andersen & Born, 2005). However, to understand the re-integration in the form of a new stratificational order and the understanding of how substantially new (as well as old) risks might be distributed in new ways in late modern society, one should turn the writings of Pierre Bourdieu.

Knowledge as cultural capital
Bourdieu is not so much interested in the characterisation of late modernity as in the introduction of a “general political economy of practice” (Bourdieu, 19XX): By this he means the generalisation of the theory of economic capital and market mechanisms to all forms of social practice. This could sound a lot like rational choice theory, but on the contrary the generalisation involves the understanding of capital as all forms of sedimented power or “social-physical energy” that can be stored for later usage (Bourdieu, 1986). For example cultural capital is seen as knowledge and skills, in the form of either material objects (books, paintings), institutionally sanctioned credentials or contained in the workings of the habitus, whereas social capital is seen as the forms of capital available for a person via her social network and personal contacts.
	Bourdieu uses this generalisation of the concept of capital to broaden the understanding of stratification and class. Under the heading of social space, he underlines that modern stratification involves (at least) two dimensions, first the total volume of all sorts of capital, and second, the composition of capital, of which economic and cultural capital are the two most important forms in most western societies today (Bourdieu, 1984, 1996). Hence, social space outlines two dimensions of stratification and differences among classes and class fractions, and therefore two dimensions along the lines of which conflicts, dominance, and exclusion can be observed​[3]​:






Figure 2: Classes in the social space (See also Harrits, forthcoming)

Following this conceptualisation, it should be noticed that the constitution of the different classes or social groups are founded upon the combination of the amount of resources and the specific type of resources. Thus, studying stratification and it s effects (for e.g. the distribution of social risks) it is of no use to look at the effects of one resource (education, income etc.). In other words, what is interesting is primarily the interacting effect of economic and cultural capital.
	In a society increasingly dominated by reflexive modernization and the uses of knowledge, this description of stratification in western societies is extremely useful. Hence, utilizing Bourdieu, it can be hypothesized that the groups (or classes) most evidently in risk of being excluded are not ‘single mothers’ or ‘young people’, and not even the groups in the lower end of the social space (i.e. the popular classes as Bourdieu class them), but more specifically the economic fraction of the popular classes as well as perhaps the economic fraction of the middle classes. Further, it can be hypothesized that political conflicts (e.g. on welfare state issues) will not only be along the horizontal lines, that is between those with resources and those without, but also between the cultural class fractions and the economic class fractions (See e.g. Harrits, forthcoming)
	However, Bourdieu does not only suggest a different stratificational order in late modern society. He also proposes an understanding of the mechanism producing differences in habitus, actions and life-styles:
The principle of the most important differences in the order of lifestyles and, even more, the ‘stylization of life’ lies in the variation in objective and subjective distance from the world, with its material constraints and temporal urgencies. Like the aesthetic disposition which is one dimension of it, the distant, detatched or casual disposition towards the world of other people, a disposition which can scarcely be called subjective since it is objectively internalized, can only be constituted in conditions of existence that are relatively freed from urgency. The submission to necessity, which inclines working-class people to a pragmatic, functionalist ‘aesthetic’, refusing the gratuity and futility of formal exercise and of every form of art for art’s sake, is also the principle of all the choices of daily existence and of an art of living which rejects specifically aesthetic intentions and aberrations. (Bourdieu, 1984: 376)
This principle is labelled “distance from necessity”, and the point is that differences in the urgency of material needs (or other necessities and urgencies) creates very different basic relationship to the world: a functionalistic, concrete and pragmatic relationship focused on the fulfilment of needs, or, an abstract and detached relationship focused on form and presentation.
	This definition, however, is situated in a very specific discussion of cultural consumption and life-styles, but one could hypothesize the same basic mechanism at work in relation to the process of reflexive modernization and individualization. Accordingly, the social situation of an individual, and the urgency of material needs or other forms of necessity​[4]​, could result in very different ways of handling the relationship to the self, and the uses of different self-technologies. This would mean, that the processes of individualization as described by Giddens and (to a lesser extent) Foucault is only a description relevant for some individuals. Other individuals simply do not engage in such abstract relationships, neither to the world or themselves. Consequently they are in danger of being excluded when the “rules of the social game” are changing towards the use of self-technologies. Or, perhaps these individuals are the ones in danger of not being re-skilled or empowered, but rather subjecting themselves to new kinds of authority, as suggested by Giddens (see above). 
	In sum, understanding social stratification as also founded upon cultural capital or resources increasingly important in late modernity, presents a very different point of departure for studying the distributional effects of social risks. Also, the suggestion that “distance to necessity” constitutes different basic relationships to the world and oneself provides us with an understanding of how individualization and the uses of self-technologies constitutes a substantial new social risks for specific groups.
	Other theorists have also pointed to the uses of self-technologies as possibly introducing new inclusion/exclusion-mechanisms (Andersen & Born, 2005). However, these theorists do not provide us with an understanding of why some groups are being excluded while others are being included. In other words, without an understanding of the basic stratificational order of modern society and the mechanisms at work here, we cannot begin to understand who the potentially excluded individuals are.

The Individual Action Plan
Concluding the argument, I will now very briefly give an empirical example of the uses of self-technologies in concrete policy, i.e. the introduction of the individual action plan. This is not a new example, as it has already been intensely studied and discussed (see e.g. Born & Jensen, 2005; Andersen, 2003; Herman, 1999). However, previous discussions have been focused primarily on understanding the self-technologies in themselves and their consequences in general, and hence they have not taken up the discussion of how they can be seen as an attempt to handle de-standardization and individualization, at the same time as they may contribute to further individualization and the creation of substantially new social risks.
	The concept of the individual action plan (or social contract) denotes the different uses of concrete legislative or administrative instruments, where the citizen is to engage in a discussion with the street-level-worker, outlining her own needs, goals and the implementation of concrete initiatives (on behalf of the state or the individual herself). In a Danish context, this instrument can be seen in many different areas, such as unemployment- and activation-policies (Born & Jensen, 2005), social policies towards families with special social problems (Andersen, 2003), crime and punishment of young people (Det Kriminalpræventive Råd, 2001), and in the schools, both in teaching (Herman, 1999) and in the supervision of children towards their future choice of education and employment. This last area will be further explored below.
	Common for all these examples is, that the individual client is presupposed to be able to engage in a rational discussion, with the purpose of constituting and handling her life and freedom in a responsible way. As noticed by Andersen, this way of making policy at the concrete level of interaction between citizen and street-level-workers is seen as more effective than traditional ways of implementing demands and social benefit schemes. The reason for this is, that the traditional execution of power is seen as an obstacle for helping the client. Hence, the policy undergoes an abstraction, now focusing on the client’s relationship towards herself (Andersen, 2003: 73), where the most important thing becomes the client’s motivation and her ability to handle her own life-situation – her will to empowerment, so to speak. 
	Seen in this light, the introduction of the individual action plan is a result of the ineffectiveness of a strict and controlling strategy towards individuals, and the reasons given for using the individual action plans and social policies seem to be formulated both in effectiveness-terms and moral terms. However, one could also see the introduction in a slightly different way, namely as a way of handling individualization and de-standardisation of reflexive modernity. In a situation where the needs and social situation as well as every-day lives of individuals are becoming more varied, the possibility for legislating in detail and administratively providing common instruments suited for all situations is becoming increasingly impossible. Thus, the emptying and proceduralisation of policy, i.e. the legislation on how to approach a client, gather information, evaluate and implement different instruments, is preferable. These two perspectives are deeply intertwined, though.
	Both perspectives can be observed in the “counselling on education, employment and labour markets” conducted in the Danish ‘Folkeskole’. This element is an obligatory part of teaching, although it is not bound to a specific course or curriculum. In the description of the goals and instruments in the school (Fælles Mål, Undervisningsministeriet, 2003), the basic elements of this counselling-programme are outlined, including the use of an individual action plan or, as it is called here, education plan. What is striking, is that the education plan presents some of the same elements as observed in other areas, but also have distinct traits. This is due to the fact that it is a part of an educational programme, and hence cannot presume the “clients” (i.e. the pupils) to be full-borne responsible and rational individuals. On the contrary it is evident that even though some level of responsibility is presupposed, the basic goal is exactly to create or constitute the pupil as an active, responsible citizens.
	This is especially evident in the first goal of the programme, namely “the personal choice” (Undervisningsministeriet, 2003: Slutmål). Here it is evident that the pupil should be made capable of stating her own wishes and competencies, evaluating her possibilities and conducting a balanced and responsible choice. This is facilitated through the use of the education plan, implemented from the 6th to the 9th year. The education plan and the education book (an instrument to be used in the process of formulating the education plan) contains three elements:
Status – where and who am I?
In the first phase, the point of departure is the actual life-situation of the pupil. The pupil needs counselling to uncover his/her dreams as well as strength and weaknesses, to develop knowledge of him/herself and his/her present situation, [...] and develops the ability to present him/herself.
Goals – where to I want to go?
In the second phase, the pupil moves away from dreams and wishes and towards realistic and clear goals. In this phase the pupil needs counselling in setting up realistic goals and investigating different alternatives,
Action – how do I get there?
In the third and final phase, the pupil must transform the goals to concrete activities and present a time schedule. The counsellors are partners, when the young person needs counselling to move on with his/her considerations as well as to put focus on the possible consequences of the plan. (Undervisningsministeriet, 2003: Undervisningsvejledning, my translation, GSH)
It is evident, how the education plan is an example of the reflexive modernization and the uses of knowledge in the choice of identity and life-style. Further, the formulation of this policy introduces the attempt to train pupils in the uses of self-technologies, and it is clear how the goals of the state (the education of its citizens and the allocation of pupils to different areas of the labour market) is intertwined with the goals of empowerment and the ethical goals of each individual for her own life. As such, this example clearly demonstrates the changing relationship between state and individual in the age of ‘governmentality’. 
	Also, the instrument of the education plan can be seen as a proceduralization in light of changing social circumstances. The possibility of providing the pupils with full information about labour markets is today almost impossible, and hence the introduction of an instrument targeting the counselling towards the special situation of each pupil seems effective. Further, the introduction of the education plan tries to meet the withering away of the traditional ways of informing children about adult life (as well as the traditional allocation of individuals in “following footsteps” of their parents):
Previously it could be counted upon that pupils had basic stories of working life from home, but changes in the family, education- and working-life, new habits of media-usage etc. have resulted in this no longer being the case. Therefore it is important to include the whole life in the counselling on education and employment, and in the planning of future education. (Undervisningsministeriet, 2003: Læseplan, my translation, GSH)
As is also the case in other areas, the possibility of the individual action plan resulting in the empowerment of citizens is evident. Some individuals (whether they are clients or pupils) will clearly benefit from the introduction of the individual action plan, and they will be able to use it as an instrument to further their own choices and possibilities of controlling their own life-situation.
	However, the possibility of exclusion is equally evident. As mentioned above, based on the understanding of stratification suggested by Bourdieu, it can be hypothesized that some individuals definitely will not be able to engage in such abstract and rational forms of reasoning. Hence, they run the risk of not being able to present themselves as rational and responsible citizens. Strengthening the vocabulary, one could say that they run the risk of not conforming to the standards of being a normal person.
	This could, then, mean the coupling of exclusions to many other different areas that presupposes the competent handling of one-self and the use of self-technologies. This of course has to do with the introduction of self-technologies in more and more areas (both in the labour market and in the state). However, it could also be related to the fact that in a de-standardized and individualised administrative practice, the personal competencies and evaluations​[5]​ of the individual street-level worker (e.g. social workers, day-carers, doctors, or teachers) will become more decisive. Taking this line of argument, then, means that the possibility of exclusion is not only present in relation to welfare state benefits but also in the provision of service.

Concluding remarks
This paper has tried to suggest some ways of sociologically informing the discussion on welfare state change and especially the formation of new social risks. Of course, the risks of being excluded from a labour market on the basis of lack of skills is still important, but the exclusionary focus on the political economy tends to neglect some of the most essential transformations of modern society. 
	Taken the concept of reflexive modernization as a point of departure, it has been suggested to look at the transformations of the “personhood” and the introduction of self-technologies as changing the relationship between the individual and the state. These new self-technologies may be seen as introducing substantially new social risks not considered by traditional welfare state researchers. 
	Further, it was suggested to include the growing importance of knowledge and cultural resources in the conceptualisation of stratification. It was argued, that it is important not to forget the possible introduction of new ways of social integration and homogenization in late modernity, since it is precisely these new forms of integration and stratification that may result in a new distributional logic of social risks.
	Finally the individual action plan was considered as an empirical example of the introduction of self-technologies, and possible consequences for exclusion was suggested. Here it was pointed out, that because of the nature of these self-technologies, exclusion might not be inherent only in relation to benefits but also in relation to welfare state service. This points towards new areas of research of the interaction between street-level-workers and citizens. Closing the argument, one final area of future research should be mentioned. As was demonstrated, the introduction of self-technologies may present the danger of being excluded on the grounds of not conforming to the standards of ‘being a person’. This could possibly touch upon the fundamental understanding of deservingness, and seen in this light further dynamic consequences for the development of the welfare states could be imagined.
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^1	  When trying to make the discussion of welfare state research more sociologically informed, it would be appropriate to mention that the concept of risk as used by Esping-Andersen (and hence the use that I will make of the concept throughout this paper) has very little to do with the concept of risk suggested by Ulrich Beck (1992). Beck opposes the distribution of wealth (belonging to the modern social order) and the distribution of risks (belonging to reflexive modernization or risk society), and the concept of risk then introduces a new and different logic inherent in the transformation of late modernity: Even though Beck mentions for example the risk of poverty, he clearly states that the kind of risks that he is discussing have “a new quality” (Beck, 1992: 22)
^2	  I am aware that some of these areas are indeed already actively being researched in what seems to be very promising research programmes (e.g. Andersen. 2003, Born og Jensen, 2005).
^3	  This heuristic outline of the stratificational structure of late modern societies is essentially Weberian, i.e. the understanding of the concept of class aims at the understanding of differences of resources and social surroundings of individuals and groups, resulting in differences in habitus, conceptions, actions, and taste (just to mentions a few elements).
^4	  The ability to control ones own life situation is not just a matter of fulfilling basic material needs. Other forms of outer control, such as restrictions resulting from state regulation in relation to for example welfare state benefits could very well also be of importance.
^5	   Which are presumably founded upon a habitus and social position completely different from most of their clients.
